Osgoode Hall Law Journal
Volume 44, Number 1 (Spring 2006)

Harry Arthurs and the Philosopher's Stone
Peer Zumbansen
Osgoode Hall Law School of York University, pzumbansen@osgoode.yorku.ca

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/ohlj
Part of the Law Commons
Commentary

Citation Information
Zumbansen, Peer. "Harry Arthurs and the Philosopher's Stone." Osgoode Hall Law Journal 44.1 (2006) : 105-117.
http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/ohlj/vol44/iss1/5

This Commentary is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Osgoode Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Osgoode Hall Law Journal by an authorized editor of Osgoode Digital Commons.

Article 5

Commentary

HARRY ARTHURS AND THE
PHILOSOPHER'S STONE©

BY PEER ZUMBANSEN*

I.

CATCH ME IF YOU CAN

A.

Always More Than You Can See

As would seem appropriate for this occasion, this commentary is
but a small attempt to illuminate some central features of Harry Arthurs
and his work being celebrated. The strong interconnections between the
themes in Arthurs' work are readily apparent. These themes are, for
obvious reasons, on the agenda of contemporary (labour, and general)
legal analysis and legal reform debates. And yet, this does not render
the commentator's task any easier. While it might seem obvious that a
short commentary in this context should aspire to be, at best, a brief
exposition of the insights and further questions raised by the celebrated
scholarship, it presents quite a challenge to take the first suitable steps
in this undertaking. The famous "three remarks," "four points," or "five
theses" that speakers at comparable occasions usually resort to as a
springboard or a safety net for their discussion cannot hide the problem
that the chosen, allegedly "central notions," "key concepts," or "guiding
questions" might all just be very arbitrary choices. The key notions
identified in somebody else's thinking are in fact the very foundations
and expressions of one's own restlessness and wonder. Similar to the
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tendency of writing the same book each time again, everything outside
ourselves is seen as confirming and supporting all that we have always
been wondering about in the first place. Our own preoccupations
become those of the world.
B.

Labour Law and The New Economy or The Philosopher's Stone,
Lying On The Kitchen Table

In her article,2 Katherine Stone identifies flexibilization,
globalization, and privatization as the three key challenges to labour
rights in our time. Working with these labels, which could each
represent a treasure chest as much as a Pandora's box, Stone unfolds an
intricate critique of the contemporary political economy of work and the
legal regulatory framework that governs, or still hopes to govern, work.
It is clear from her concentrated parlance that her article is but
an elaboration of, an excursion from, and a guide to what is a much
larger body of work and scholarship dedicated to the study of the
conditions and norms shaping today's workplace. The student of Stone's
work on work is rewarded by an inside account of a long series of
investigations, astute findings, and illuminating reports on the current
beleaguered state of labour and employment law.3 And against the
background of a conscious or unconscious education through Hannah
Arendt's Vita Activa4 or Karl Polanyi's Great Transformation,5 her work
dwells upon Michael Piore and Charles Sabel,6 Lawrence Lessig,7 and
Arthurs, who represent our guides to the facts and norms of the
workplace in the knowledge economy.

2 Katherine Stone, "Flexibilization, Globalization, and Privatization: Three Challenges to

Labour Rights in our Time" (2005) 44 Osgoode Hall L.J. 77.
' See Katherine V.W. Stone, "The New Psychological Contract: Implications of the
Changing Workplace for Labor and Employment Law" (2001) 48 UCLA L. Rev. 519; Katherine
Van Wezel Stone, "To the Yukon and Beyond: Local Laborers in a Global Labor Market" (1999) 3
J. Small & Emerging Bus. L. 93; and, most recently, Katherine V.W. Stone, From Widgets to Digits:
Employment Regulation for the Changing Workplace (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2004).
Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1958).
Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation: The Politicaland Economic Origins of our Time,
2d ed. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1957).
6 Michael J. Piore & Charles F. Sabel, The Second Industrial Divide: Possibilities for
Prosperity(New York: Basic Books, 1984).
' Lawrence Lessig, Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace (New York: Basic Books, 1999).
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In this light, then, it is apparent that the "challenges to labour
rights" as described by Stone and her commentators are as clearly
demarcated as they are open to constant refinement and further
elaboration. 8 In this brief discussion, all that seems possible might be to
complement these described "challenges" with a number of key words
or notions that further elaborate what is already captured by the terms
flexibilization, globalization, and privatization. I would like to propose a
number of complementary terms in order to sketch a still wider frame of
reference for the challenges identified by Stone. Where she employs the
labels of her identified challenges as tools, drills, and torch lights to
illuminate the complex maze of economic and regulatory transformation
that characterizes work and the "law of work" in the knowledge
economy, Stone's labels already point beyond themselves. As such, each
term of art becomes suggestive of its continuation and elaboration, but
also, of course, of its own contestation.
Alternative labels, then, are nothing else than expressions of a
productive contestation from which an essential element of admiration
can certainly never be denied. The proposed terms come from my own
"EndNote" database into which I have been storing bibliographical
references for several years. And, for all among us who are acquainted
with this program or other comparable ones, one of the ever-recurring
and yet recurrently difficult tasks is the identification of the most
appropriate or adequate explanatory and later identifiable keyword with
which a certain work and author should be associated. This naming must
be done with great care so that the insertion of the keyword in a later
search for stored references actually delivers a usable list of data. If I
were, for example, to store publications by Arthurs or Stone under the
keyword "law," their works would likely come up together with many
others, without any more concrete acknowledgement of the particular
area or field of law or of the specific perspective brought to law by these
authors. But if I store their work under the keyword "labour law," I run
the danger of being both under- and over-specific, not to mention the
fact that such a classification would be far too reductive and limited. To
avoid such dangers, I could add keyword upon keyword, for example,
adding employment law to labour law, or industrial relations to the
former two.
8

See e.g. Judy Fudge, Eric Tucker & Leah F. Vosko, "Changing Boundaries of

Employment: Developing a New Platform for Labour Law" (2003) 10 C.L.E.L.J. 329.
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It is clear that such a classification would fail to capture the
wealth of what can be learned from these scholars. Their questions,
queries, and again, restlessness, shines through the answers they are
struggling with in their work. They are scholars, legal scholars,
employment and labour law scholars, feminist lawyers, and legal
theorists with a fervent and insatiable interdisciplinary appetite. Their
work draws not only on law, political science, sociology, history, and
economics, but also on organizational and management theory, legal
theory, and cultural studies. What label, then, might best capture the
essence of their writings? Clearly, globalization offers itself as such a
classifying and domesticating term; however, at the same time, we
perhaps render the term globalization too diffuse and ultimately
meaningless. Furthermore, in light of their work and that of others such
as Boaventura de Sousa Santos,9 Saskia Sassen, 0 or Alfred Aman,1 1 we
have long been drawn to study the domestic face of globalization, the
local production, both in fact and norms, of what had hitherto been
understood as an external, floodwave-like force and influence. The
internalization of globalization and its study as a politically-effected
transformation, the de-politicization of which continues to be the central
interest of many scholars today, forces us to lay aside all mono-causal or
uni-disciplinary explanations of globalization.
II.

WORK (COMPARATIVE LAW VS. VARIETIES OF
CAPITALISM),
REGULATORY
THEORYAND
ORGANIZATION (STATE VS. SOCIETY), AND LEGAL
EDUCATION (ELITES VS. DEMOCRACY)

The following remarks highlight three areas that seem to have
captured Arthurs' attention. They will be identified as "work,"
"regulatory theory," and "legal education." These areas can be taken as
labels for Arthurs' enduring and encompassing scholarly and political
engagemeht. This last mentioned distinction-between academic and

9Boaventura de Sousa Santos, Toward a New Legal Common Sense: Law, Globalization,
and Emancipation, 2d ed. (London: Butterworths LexisNexis, 2002).
'oSaskia Sassen, Globalization and Its Discontents:Essays on the New Mobility of People and
Money (New York: New Press, 1998); Saskia Sassen, "Globalization or denationalization?" (2003)
10 Rev. Int'l Pol. Econ'y 1.
" Alfred C. Aman Jr., The Democracy Deficit (New York: New York University Press,
2004).
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"non-academic" work, between the ivory tower and the political arenaallows us to grasp, perhaps more appropriately, the width of Arthurs'
inquiry. In that respect, each of these three terms, work, regulatory
theory, and legal education, are mere labels for larger undertakings and
orientations.
A.

Work

"Work" as keyword and challenge reaches beyond labour and
employment law to capture the analytical perspectives on the political
regulation of work, the workplace and the system of contract, industrial
relations, workers' representation, and perhaps even co-determination.
productivity,
It also touches on the promises for work today:
proprietorship, and alienation. Work becomes a challenge to the law
and politics of the theory of the welfare state just as much as an
argument for the strengthening of transnational labour rights for
sweatshop workers and other disenfranchised modern-day slaves. Work,
then, radically unfolds between different and competing research and
policy agendas. A traditional comparative law approach, taken most
dominantly by corporate governance scholars around the world, wants
to make us believe that a universal convergence of rules pertaining to
corporate control and organization is taking place,12 where little to no
room is left for workers' voices. 3 However, we can see the unfolding of
a competing paradigm. Whereas the comparative law approach
disconnects human capital, and with it work and workers, from the
business firm,14 scholars of and around the so-called "Varieties of
Capitalism School"' 5 reconstruct corporate governance as a

12Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, "The End of History for Corporate Law" (2001)

89 Geo. L.J. 439.
" See e.g. the recent collection of country studies on the rules governing workers' codetermination and works councils in corporations. Theodor Baums & Peter Ulmer, eds.,
Employees' Co-Determination in the Member States of the European Union (Heidelberg: Verlag
Recht und Wirtschaft, 2004).
" Katherine V.W. Stone, "Knowledge at Work: Disputes over the Ownership of Human
Capital in the Changing Workplace" (2002) 34 Conn. L. Rev. 721; Simon Deakin, "The Many
Futures of the Contract of Employment" in Joanne Conaghan, Richard Michael Fischl & Karl
Klare, eds., Labour Law in an Era of Globalization: Transformative Practices and Possibilities
(London: Oxford University Press, 2002) 177.
15Peter A. Hall & David Soskice, eds., Varieties of Capitalism: The InstitutionalFoundations
of Comparative Advantage (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001); Sigurt Vitols, "Varieties of
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comprehensive, yet highly dynamic regulatory regime that positions the
16
firm in wider socio-economic, political, and historical contexts.
Understood as a challenge to contemporary innovative thinking and
regulatory politics, the firm provokes ait interdisciplinary and
transnational research program. Work in the "New Economy""i forms
an integral part of our critical inquiry into the political economy of
corporate, labour, business, and social law, and it is this perspective to
which Arthurs pervasively adheres. 8
B.

Regulatory Theory and Organization

The terms "regulatory theory and organization" relate and speak
to the current transformation of our understanding of what regulation
through law can achieve and, ultimately, what the law can and cannot
do.19 This discussion, also unfolded as "legal pluralism," has for a long
time been a hunting ground for Arthurs. ° Regulatory theory speaks to
the norm-producing dimensions of today's changing regulatory

Corporate Governance: Comparing Germany and the UK" in Peter A. Hall & David Soskice, eds.,
(ibid. at 337); John W. Cioffi, "Restructuring 'Germany Inc.': The Politics of Corporate
Governance Reform in Germany and the European Union" (2002) 24 Law & Pol'y 355; and Peer
Zumbansen, "European Corporate Law and National Divergences: The Case of Takeover
Regulation" (2004) 3 Wash. U. Global Stud. L. Rev. 867.
1"Walter W. Powell, "The Capitalist Firm in the Twenty-First Century: Emerging Patterns
in Western Enterprise" in Paul Dimaggio, ed., The Twenty-First-Century Firm: Changing Economic
Organizationin InternationalPerspective (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001) 33.
17Joanne Conaghan, "Labour Law and the 'New Economy' Discourse" (2003) 16 Austl. J.
Lab. L. 9 [Conaghan, "Labour Law"]; see also the concise analysis by Manfred Weiss, "The Future
of Comparative Labor Law as an Academic Discipline and as a Practical Tool" (2003) 25 Comp.
Lab. L. & Pol'y J. 169; and Kerry Rittich, Vulnerability at Work.- Legal and Policy Issues in the New
Economy (Ottawa: Law Commission of Canada Research Paper, 2004).
18 Harry W. Arthurs, "Private Ordering and Workers' Rights in the Global Economy:

Corporate Codes of Conduct as a Regime of Labour Market Regulation" in Conaghan, Fischl &
Kare, supra note 14 at 471 [Arthurs, "Private Ordering"]; Harry W. Arthurs, "Reinventing Labor
Law for the Global Economy: The Benjamin Aaron Lecture" (2001) 22 Berkeley J. Emp. & Lab. L.
271.
19An excellent overview of the contemporary discussion is now provided by David LeviFaur, "The Global Diffusion of Regulatory Capitalism" (2005) 598 Annals Amer. Acad. Pol. & Soc.
Sci. 12.
20 See Harry W. Arthurs, Without the Law: Administrative Justice and Legal Pluralism in
Nineteenth Century England (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988); Harry W. Arthurs,
"Governance After the Washington Consensus: The Public Domain, the State and the
Microphysics of Power in Contrasting Economies" (2002) 29 Man & Dev. 85; and Arthurs, "Private
Ordering," supra note 18.
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landscape. We find that law-making takes place on all levels, be it
domestic or international, and in forms that can no longer be easily
associated with either public or private spheres.2" Complementing and
breaking with these dichotomies, however, is the transnationalparadigm
that suggests a diffusion of our traditional concepts of actors and
actions.2 2 Transnational labour law involves state and non-state actors in
the production of norms, which also means that the nature of the norms
we are dealing with is changing.2 3 We have learned from Arthurs and,
for example, from Kerry Rittich2 4 and Adele Blackett,"5 that there is no
merit in dismissing corporate codes of conduct simply as non-law. This
dismissal would lead to, a petrification of our understanding of law and,
thus, of our search for adequately responsive and reliable forms of
societal self-governance. Instead, we need to reconsider the spectrum of
our questions when attempting to assert the legal nature of these new,
unofficial, or soft, norms. Again, the question will define our answers:
what is law supposed to achieve? With this question we can begin to
assess the current regulatory landscape.
The question of regulation has been reformulated as a farreaching inquiry into the possibility of sustaining the paradoxes of public
and private freedom, 6 and of listening to the heartbeat of civil

21 Peer Zumbansen, "Transnational Law" in Jan Smits, ed., Encyclopedia of Comparative

Law(Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2006) 738.
22 See especially the groundbreaking work of Philip C. Jessup, Transnational Law (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1956). See also Harold Hongju Koh, "Transnational Legal Process"
(1996) 75 Neb. L. Rev. 181; Craig Scott & Robert Wai, "Transnational Governance of Corporate
Conduct through the Migration of Human Rights Norms: The Potential of Transnational 'Private'
Litigation" in Christian Joerges, Inger-Johanne Sand & Gunther Teubner, eds., Transnational
Governance and Constitutionalism(Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2004) 287.
23 Harry W. Arthurs, "Labour Law Without the State" (1996) 46 U.T.L.J. 1 [Arthurs,
"Labour Law"].
24 Kerry Rittich, Recharacterizing Restructuring: Law, Distribution and Gender in Market
Reform (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2002). See also Kerry Rittich, "Enchantments of
Reason/Coercions in Law" (2003) 57 U. Miami L. Rev. 727.
25 Adelle Blackett, "Global Governance, Legal Pluralism and the Decentered State: A
Labor Law Critique of Codes of Corporate Conduct" (2001) 8 Ind. J. Global Leg. Stud. 401.
26 See generally Jurgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, trans. by William Rehg
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 1996); A. Claire Cutler, Private Power and GlobalAuthority: Transnational
Merchant Law in the Global Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); and Peer
Zumbansen, "Sustaining Paradox Boundaries: Perspectives on Internal Affairs in Domestic and
International Law" (2004) 15 E.J.I.L. 197.
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revolutions in an era of periodicizing and reassessing the rule of law,27
the interventionist state, 28 and the welfare state. 29 This inquiry takes
place in the midst of a post-modern, post-regulatory experiment and in a
global
regulatory
post-national,
radically
de-territorialized,
environment.3" Reaching beyond the disciplinary confines of the field,
Arthurs mobilizes labour law as a radical force to deconstruct the
allegedly universal story of global progress, the end of history, and the
supreme law of the market. With labour law under siege, law finds itself
with its back against the wall, constantly pressed to find a good reason of
why it should be there at all.31 Transforming this constellation into one
of asking whether and why we care about law, the existential defence
provokes further existential questions.32 Where law reconstitutes itself as
force and imaginative practice, it now must do so in light of a radically
transformed socio-economic, global environment. What the law can do
appears inseparable from what non-law can do. While the lessons of
legal pluralism and legal anthropology33 have barely reached the
sanctuaries of mainstream law school curricula, let alone the legal
profession, their struggle for survival against the omnipresent, allegedly
all-encompassing, self-explanatory, and usurping forces of law and
economy already runs full speed ahead. With our continuing search for
law after the regulatory aspirations of the democratic welfare state,34
and in face of the persisting conundrum of social self-governance, even
27

Morton J. Horwitz, "The Rule of Law: An Unqualified Human Good?" (1977) 86 Yale

L.J. 566; Allan C. Hutchinson & Patrick Monahan, eds., The Rule of Law: Ideal or Ideology
(Toronto: Carswell, 1987).
28 Michael Stolleis, "Die Entstehung des Interventionsstaates und das 6ffentliche Recht"
(1989) 11 Z.N.R. 129.
9 Niklas Luhmann, Political Theory in the Welfare State, trans. by John Bednarz Jr. (Berlin:
Walter de Gruyter, 1990).
o Arthurs, "Labour Law," supra note 23.
3'Conaghan, "Labour Law," supra note 17.
32 Harry W. Arthurs, "The World Turned Upside Down: Are Changes in Political Economy
and Legal Practice Transforming Legal Education and Scholarship, or Vice Versa?" (2001) 8 Int'l
J. Leg. Prof. 11.
Sally Falk Moore, "Law and social change: the semi-autonomous field as an appropriate
subject of study" (1973) 7 Law & Soc. Rev. 719; Sally Engle Merry, "Legal Pluralism" (1988) 22
Law & Soc. Rev. 869.
4 Jirgen Habermas, "The New Obscurity: The Crisis of the Welfare State and the
Exhaustion of Utopian Energies" in Jirgen Habermas, ed., The New Conservatism: Cultural
Criticism and the Historians'Debate, ed. and trans. by Shierry Weber Nicholsen (Cambridge, MA:
MIT Press, 1989) 48.
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"after privatization,"35 we find ourselves now engaged in an inquiry that
is interdisciplinary, transnational, and in light of the recent challenges to
the notoriously fragile "international" law,36 ever more important.3 7
The second half of our keyword couple, organization, gives
expression to ongoing explorations into the constitution of the firm and
applicable management theories, from traditional and hierarchical to
post-modern, heterarchical, and intercultural concepts of management.
Here we are concerned with the worker as member of the firm, a
complex institution of ongoing societal learning. 38 The firm is no longer
merely a private actor, but what is it? Path-dependencies in our
conceptualization of state and society, public and private, political and
non-political, stand in our way of adequately understanding the new
nature of the firm. As it has increasingly assumed public functions,
particularly in the context of privatization, the firm sheds its allegedly
private nature and transforms into a hybrid public-private social
organization. The firm, certainly, is not the only organization
undergoing such changes. Upon closer view, we see convergence in
supposedly private studies of corporate management theory and work
done in administrative law and administrative science, where regulatory
bodies that rely existentially on private, societally-fragmented
knowledge place a high demand on organizational and management

3 Gunther Teubner, "After Privatization? The Many Autonomies of Private Law" (1998)
51 Curr. Legal Probs. 393.
3 Martti Koskenniemi, "'The Lady Doth Protest Too Much': Kosovo, and the Turn to
Ethics in International Law" (2002) 65 Mod. L. Rev. 159; Martti Koskenniemi, "International Law
in Europe: Between Tradition and Renewal" (2005) 16 E.J.I.L. 124; and Ed Morgan, "The Other
Death of International Law" (2001) 14 Leiden J. Int'l L. 3.
11 See the discussion in Andreas L. Paulus, "The War Against Iraq and the Future of
International Law: Hegemony or Pluralism?" (2004) 25 Mich. J. Int'l L. 691.
38 See Dirk Baecker, PostheroischesManagement: Ein Vademecum (Berlin: Merve, 1994);
Michel Crozier, Lentreprise ai rcoute: Apprendre le management post-industriel (1989) (Paris: Seuil,
1994); Simon Deakin, Tom Goodwin & Alan Hughes, "Co-operation and Trust in Inter-Firm
Relations: Beyond Competition Policy?" in Simon Deakin & Jonathan Michie, eds., Contracts, Cooperation, and Competition: Studies in Economics, Managementand Law (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1997) 339; Paul K. Edwards, John Geary & Keith Sisson, "New Forms of Work Organization
in the Workplace: Transformative, Exploitative, or Limited and Controlled?" in Gregor Murray et
al., eds., Work Employment Relations in the High-Performance Workplace (London: Continuum,
2002) 72; Christiane Prange, "Interorganisationelles Lernen: Lernen in, von und zwischen
Organisationen" in Jorg Sydow, ed., Management von Netzwerkorganisationen (Wiesbaden: Gabler,
2001) 151; and Peer Zumbansen, Innovation und Pfadabhdngigkeit: Das Recht der
Unternehmensverfassungin der Wissensgesellschaft (Habilitation thesis, University of Frankfurt 2004)
[forthcoming 2006].
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theory.39 The contractualization of knowledge transfers between civil
society and the agencies of the regulatory welfare and post-welfare state
resembles in many ways the production of knowledge within large,
boundaryless corporations.
C.

Legal Education

Finally, the theme of legal education in Arthurs' work eventually
succeeds, while potentially embarrassing us for our own lack of a
comparably tireless struggle for reform,4" in inspiring and empowering
us in our daily attempts to strike the right balance of "distance and
care," "freedom and constraint," "experiment and guidance," and
"innovation and routine." In our continuing search for the optimal mix
of solid education, professional training, and life long critical learning,4
Arthurs powerfully reminds us of the overriding value in constantly
questioning our practice and underlying assumptions, in "doing the
research," instead of repeating half-heartedly the same mistakes that
were made yesterday. These reminders continue to inspire, to intrigue,
and for some, perhaps, to irritate.
Today, the struggle for democratic access to higher education
continues. 42 At the same time, change has long been coming with respect
to the demographic and territorial transformation of today's student

"9Karl-Heinz Ladeur, "Privatisierung 6ffentlicher Aufgaben und die Notwendigkeit der
Entwicklung eines neuen Informationsverwaltungsrechts" in Wolfgang Hoffmann-Riem &
Eberhard Schmidt-Assmann, eds., Verwaltungsrecht in der Informnationsgesellschaft (Baden-Baden:
Nomos, 2000) 225; Peer Zumbansen, "Vertragsregimes im 'Dritten Sektor': Zur Verortung des
Verwaltungsrechts angesichts des Zusammenwachsens privat- und 6ffentlichrechtlicher
Handlungsformen" in W. Rainer Walz, Karsten Schmidt & Hein K6tz, eds., Non Profit Law
Yearbook, vol. 2 (Koln: Heymanns, 2003) at 61.
4 See Harry W. Arthurs, "Poor Canadian Legal Education: So Near to Wall Street, So Far
from God" (2000) 38 Osgoode Hall L.J. 381; Harry W. Arthurs, "The Spider, The Bee, The Snail
And The Camel: Legal Knowledge, Practise, Culture, Institutions and Power in a Changing World"
(Keynote address at the Canadian Graduate Law Students Conference, Osgoode Hall Law School,
Toronto, May 2005), online:
Comparative Research in Law and Political Economy
< http://www.comparativeresearch.net>.
41 See e.g. the contributions to McGill's recently embraced theme of "transsystemic legal
education" for its curriculum reform: (2005) 50 McGill L.J. [forthcoming 2006] (with contributions
by Harry Arthurs, Rod Macdonald, Susan Drummond, and others); see also the strategic plan for
Osgoode Hall Law School, with a strong emphasis on reconceiving legal education in a global and
critical perspective [2005].
42 See the excellent discussion by Susan Boyd, "Corporatism and Legal Education in
Canada" (2005) 14 Soc. & Legal Stud. 287.
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(and faculty) bodies. With prospective students likely to be more mobile
and de-territorialized in their selection of higher education institutions,
the same may be true with respect to their employment opportunities
after graduation. Questions regarding the direction and content of
curricula might have progressed to reflect a higher degree of the law
school's nervousness as a complex institution and its responsiveness to
the "needs of the market." Yet, contemporary, frantic attempts to adapt
the university to market demands lack a wider-scale assessment of the
conditions, role, and function of education and learning as such.4 3 With
national traditions and trajectories proving to be very influential in
shaping future thinking about education and university reform, much
remains to be done to bring together these distinct, national, or
segregated discourses. Arthurs' call for a radical approach to
understanding legal education as a wide-reaching program in social and
political studies44 gives testimony of his standing commitment to think
more encompassingly. Discussing, then, legal theory from the
perspective of the "political economy of (legal) education," the
formation and training of lawyers becomes a crucial inquiry into the
democratic accessibility of university studies and the training of elites.
This endeavour gives rise to questions of power and exclusion, of
identity and of finding oneself again.45
4 Roderick A. Macdonald & Jason MacLean, "No Toilets in Park" (2005) 50 McGill L.J.
[forthcoming in 2006] [Macdonald & MacLean, "No Toilets"]; see especially Section B: Identity,
Power, Hierarchy, in which the authors argue for a radical set of questions pertaining to the goals
and objectives of legal education, that is itself defined as "interpretive practice"; and see also
Roderick A. Macdonald, "The National Law Programme at McGill: Origins, Establishment,
Prospects" (1990) 13 Dal. L. J. 211.
4 See Harry W. Arthurs, "Where Have You Gone, John R. Commons, Now That We Need
You So?" (2000) 21 Comp. Lab. Law & Pol'y J. 373; Harry W. Arthurs, "The Political Economy of
Canadian Legal Education" (1998) 25 J.L. & Soc'y 14; Harry W. Arthurs, "The State We're In:
Legal Education in Canada's New Political Economy" (2001) 20 Windsor Y.B. Access Just. 35; and
Harry W. Arthurs, "Madly Off In One Direction: McGill's New Integrated, Poly-Jural, TransSystemic Law Program" (2005) 50 McGill L.J. [forthcoming 2006].
" See Macdonald & MacLean, "No Toilets," supra note 43 at n. 143, with a pointed
reference to Peter Goodrich, "Law and the Courts of Love: Andreas Capellanus and the Judgments
Of Love" (1996) 48 Stan. L. Rev. 633. In his article, Goodrich writes (ibid. at 675): "Legal training
teaches the subject to separate the personal and the legal, demanding the repression of emotion
and the privileging of the objectivity of rules over the subjectivities of truth-Aristotle's wisdom
without desire." Goodrich goes on to say: "[I]t draws the subject into a network of relations and an
institutional environment modeled upon legal definitions and valuations of persons, actions, and
things. It is an environment which, by its nature, is competitive, antagonistic, and frequently
destructive. ... [L]awyers will tend to find love or relationship elsewhere--either in a past that came
before the law, or in a spectral domain outside the law, tenuously, if not tenebrously, exterior to the
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This dialectical process is painfully felt throughout one's
academic career, so it is no surprise that it has repercussions already in
the first stages of legal university training. The ambiguity of technical
terms, legal concepts, and principles coincides with the daily challenge
to position oneself and one's work. 46 This is particularly felt where
academic research, writing, and teaching is so intertwined with real
politics, as is the case when working in labour law. 47 The openendedness of the category "labour law" allows us to make visible
"national traditions" of labour law scholarship,4" and these traditions
again are intertwined, non-linear, disputed, and contested. How could
this not be otherwise? 49 It is the constant challenge of the researcher and
the teacher to work in light of this complex history in order to carefully
help shape the future. Whether keywords, suitable for database archives
or for bullet-pointed speech outlines, capture the wealth of complex
history hiding behind simple formula, matters less than whether they are
taken as invitations to dig deeper into the history and the sociological,
political, economic, and legal discourses through which these keywords
have come to prominence. While such an undertaking inevitably will

individual persona. It is a love sought elsewhere, a lawyerly amour lointain attached to exteriorities,
a byproduct of commodities, or of the mirroring function of status. In Freud's terms, such love is
either pre-Oedipal, the repetition of a primary attachment, or a species of narcissism. In whichever
form, it is likely to be unconscious unless the legal persona has had the advantage of considerable
therapeutic help. In the end, my analysis leaves one question: If I give so much of my time to the
law, how much of the law speaks through me? [Emphasis in original]."
46 See, for the terms "economic law" and "social law," Rudolf Wieth61ter,
Rechtswissenschaft (Frankfurt: Fischer, 1968) at 168.
" See Harry W. Arthurs, "National Traditions in Labor Law Scholarship: The Canadian
Case" (2002) 23 Comp. Lab. Law & Pol'y J. 645.
48Ibid. at 646.

" See the discussion in H. Patrick Glenn, Legal Traditionsof the World: SustainableDiversity
in Law, 2d ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004). See also H. Patrick Glenn, "Doin' the the
Transsystemic: Legal Systems and Legal Traditions" (2005) 50 McGill L. J. 863 [forthcoming 2006].
Glenn writes, "Tradition conceived as information has no borders. Groups defined by adherence to
tradition may create borders for themselves, but this will be the product of particular traditions
only, such as that of legal systems. So, tradition, as a general concept, can have no underlying idea
of territorial supremacy. Tradition is a general idea, but allows itself to be particularized to
everyone's particular way of life. Tradition is therefore not a hegemonic idea, though cannot itself
prevent the development of hegemonic traditions. The relations between traditions are thus in
principle relations of influence and persuasion, as opposed to conflict and dominance. ... Teaching
the merits of different laws, in a dialogical process in the same classroom, must therefore be based
on their traditional and normative character. The process is not one of description, but rather of
engagement."
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illuminate local, regional, and national history, it will also highlight the
connections, interdependencies, and parallels between different
national and transnational discourses. Why not use keywords such as
"work," "regulatory theory and organization," and "legal education" to
reach for a better understanding of the law-and of ourselves?

